When Diplomacy Fails

By William F. Sauerwein

In the midst of our war against terrorism the United States struggles in finding a balance between military strategy and diplomacy. President George W. Bush, in his first post-9/11 State of the Union address proclaimed three major enemies, called the “Axis of Evil.” However, the “loyal opposition” Democrats, feeling emboldened following the collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, called Bush “reckless.” They demand massive diplomatic effort for avoiding war, and only taking military action with the consent of the “global community.” While diplomacy remains the desired first effort at avoiding conflict, it must include military options when diplomacy fails.

Diplomacy only succeeds when both parties desire amicable terms, beneficial for both, normally between nations with like-minded principles. Today we find that negotiations with the “Axis of Evil” nations grossly disappointing, yet we continually hope for their becoming “reasonable.” This comes from the State Department’s obsession that “moderate elements” exist in Iran and North Korea. It further stems from the preponderance of college-level “conflict resolution” studies, and little “real world” experience of these diplomats.

The studies reflect resolving conflicts between two equal-thinking parties, normally of similar principles and beliefs. In the “real world” we find that “bad people” exist, and in many cases lead “rogue nations.” The current popular phrase of this doctrine is “win-win,” meaning no one loses. However, when dealing with enemies we must think like an athletic competition, where someone wins, but someone also loses.

Following 9/11 we faced a situation unfamiliar to most Americans, an attack by a shadowy terrorist organization. These “stateless” organizations only exist with the support of “rogue nations,” something we long knew, and long ignored. While declaring war on us throughout the ‘90’s, we sought evidence for criminal trials. Given the relative success in Afghanistan we continue ignoring these threats from our perceived sanctuary.

The world faced similar circumstances before World War II, in which the then-superpowers, Britain and France, felt secure. Most of the rest of the world relied on them for leadership and security, and did not prepare militarily. They ignored the rumblings of the small, insignificant nations of Germany, Italy and Japan. Everyone assumed the League of Nations would solve all international disputes, because no one could want war after World War I’s devastation.

First we must understand that World War I did not end in a total victory. German troops still held positions in Belgium, France and occupied parts of the defeated Russian Empire. Massive numbers of American troops continued arriving in France, something the Germans could not replicate. Those already in France achieved several victories during the summer and fall of 1918. Their commander, General John J. Pershing planned an offensive in the spring of 1919, ending inside Germany. German commanders, facing low morale on the battlefront and dissension at home, knew they could not stop this attack. They approached the British and French, weary after four years of war, for seeking terms of peace.

While both sides hoped for an end of this devastating war, each side also possessed ulterior motives. Germany hoped for terms that would avoid military defeat, and preserve order at home. Britain and France, jealous of the “upstart Americans,” hoped to minimize the American impact on victory, and future global events.

The negotiations resulting in the Treaty of Versailles present a lesson for how diplomacy must not be conducted. Germany felt they entered these negotiations as an equal partner, latching onto President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.” Wilson’s speech, made in January 1918, does not contain the word “surrender,” or any statement proclaiming Germany’s “defeat.”

However, Britain and France ignored Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” and wanted Germany’s war machine dismantled. France, in particular, demanded the punishment of Germany, and revenge for their defeat during the 1871 Franco-Prussian War.

Though angered, German negotiators possessed few options given their current circumstances, and signed the terms. Their Central Powers allies previously all negotiated surrender terms, meaning Germany would fight alone. The resulting resentment of these treaties sowed the seeds that led to World War II. Ironically, the former Central Power nations of Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary joined the Axis Powers.

Resentment also affected the Allied nations of Italy and Japan, both of whom felt mistreated in the distribution of the “spoils.” Both of whom became totalitarian nations, launched aggressive wars on weaker nations and the major allies of Nazi Germany.

The U.S. provided a sterling example of how domestic politics adversely affects foreign policy. When Wilson traveled to Paris for the peace negotiations he took only senators from his Democrat Party. Republicans, who won control of the Senate in the 1918 election, felt snubbed and would not ratify the treaty. Another source of discontent was Wilson’s proposed international League of Nations, which many senators felt diminished Congress’ role in declaring war.

Wilson worked tirelessly in building public support for both the treaty and the League of Nations. However, he suffered a stroke in 1919, which debilitated him, and ended this campaign. Had he taken a “bi-partisan” delegation to Paris would the results have been different; we do not know. However, we do know that Senate Republican Leader, Henry Cabot Lodge, felt snubbed and worked against Wilson.

Following World War I the United States, disillusioned with the results of the “war to end all wars,” began a period of isolationism. It appeared that the war greatly benefited Britain and France, while leaving the U.S. a huge cost in lives and treasure. For preventing future military “adventures” American military spending steadily declined over the next twenty years.

The United States did not join the League of Nations, though it did maintain an “observer” at the Geneva, Switzerland headquarters. We further enacted several naval treaties in limiting the various nations’ abilities for waging war. Naval power at this time represented the “strategic arms” of its day, and limiting “capital ships” supposedly made the world safer. We even promoted the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, eventually ratified by 62 nations, making war illegal except for defensive measures.

However, keeping these treaties requires that all parties desire peace, and cooperate in abiding by them. It further requires some enforcement “trigger,” in which violators receive punishment from the “world community.” The world looked to the reigning “superpowers,” Britain and France, for providing that enforcement.

Not everyone accepted this “new world order,” and several nations, while signing the various treaties, secretly undermined them. Small regional wars still occurred, primarily in the new Balkan nations, between newly independent Poland and Russia and the Russian Civil War. The turmoil of the Russian Civil War resulted in the Soviet Union’s formation, and the spread of international communism, the Comintern.

Britain and France, though superpowers, still reeled from the steep cost of the war, both in lives and money. As democratic nations their leaders responded to the cries of their people for social change. The cries increased with the devastation of the Great Depression, and military spending became superseded by social spending. Both nations ignored violations of the treaty, and even rationalized German violations in their determination to avoid war. When not punished for small violations, like increasing its number of military personnel, Germany then embarked upon larger violations. It began rebuilding a navy, enlarging and improving its air force and reoccupying the Rheinland.

For some reason the Allied treaty observers either did not see these violations, or their superiors made them close their eyes. Aerial reconnaissance was the “surveillance satellite” of its day, and the Allies relied on it for monitoring German troop movements. The German Army built a training camp at Baumholder in the Rheinland because its notoriously bad weather hindered this monitoring.

The League of Nations proved an ineffective bureaucracy, unable to confront aggression, or unwilling. When Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931 the League condemned it, and then did nothing. My alma mater’s library contains volumes of U.S. diplomatic records and The New York Times on microfiche. The weaker member nations relied on Britain and France for decisive leadership, Britain and France lacked sufficient military power in Asia. They passed resolutions with no enforcement conditions, and Japan walked out of the League in 1934.

Ethiopia, a weak, backward nation, joined the League hoping for a measure of security in membership. In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia, again condemned by the League, and again resulting in no “global” military response. Both Britain and France maintained large colonial empires in Africa, yet did not respond.

France, working with Italy behind the scenes, “vetoed” any call for military action. They sacrificed Ethiopia in the hope that Italy would support them against the rising power of Germany. The next year Italy and Germany became allies, in what Mussolini called the “Pact of Steel.” This speaks volumes regarding France’s reliability as an ally, and its emphasis on “global action.”

I highlight these events for revealing that today’s “global problems” are not new, or unique. Times change, as well as weaponry and ideologies, however human nature remains largely unchanged, including jealousies and aggressiveness. Unfortunately so does the naiveté of those so determined to avoid war that they purposely ignore aggression.

American strategy at the time did not extend outside the Western Hemisphere and Hawaii. We determined that maintaining the Philippine Islands was too expensive, and in 1935 passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This provided a ten-year period for developing the Philippines into a self-sufficient nation. However, given growing Japanese aggression, the Philippine’s president, Manuel Quezon, stressed his nation’s need for continued American support.

Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union continued building military power, while Britain, France and the U.S. did nothing. Britain relied on the Royal Navy and French Army for its protection; France relied on its technological marvel, the Maginot Line; and the U.S. relied on the expanse of two oceans. Evident is the difference between totalitarian regimes and democratic nations, something we continue ignoring today. Nations maintain peace and deter war only by preparing for war; no barroom bully will “try” someone who may “whip” him.

Given the “global” response, Japan invaded China in 1937, committing massive atrocities, including the infamous Nanking Massacre. In 1938 Germany annexed its World War I ally, Austria, something forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles. The Austrians (ethnic Germans) welcomed this move as evidenced by their “rock star treatment” of the visiting Adolph Hitler. Later in the same year Hitler demanded the return of the Sudetenland, a region of ethnic Germans, from Czechoslovakia. What followed is an example that should never be followed, yet so often is today.

The Czechs cherished their newfound independence, vowed to fight, and called on their British and French allies for help. Alarmed, both nations looked for any means of avoiding war, and agreed to diplomacy, engineered by Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini. Britain, France, Germany and Italy attended the infamous Munich Conference for deciding Czechoslovakia’s fate, yet no one invited the Czechs.

Hitler promised the timid British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand. Since this region previously belonged to Germany, Chamberlain readily agreed, sealing Czechoslovakia’s fate. Czechoslovakia soon learned the folly of depending on security through an alliance with superpowers.

Chamberlain returned home amid the cheering throngs of Britons, waving the agreement, and declaring “peace in our time.” Within weeks of annexing the Sudetenland, German troops surged into the remainder of Czechoslovakia, establishing the puppet state of Slovakia. Since that time this policy became known as appeasement, meaning give the aggressor what they demand, and they will be satisfied.

While these events took place the United States modestly increased its military strength amid the outcries of domestic opponents. Many of these opponents believed that increasing our military strength led directly increased our desire for using it. American military planners developed some very elaborate plans, known as the RAINBOW plans because of their color-coding. Unfortunately, we lacked the forces for fulfilling the requirements of even one of those plans.

Meanwhile, Japan continued advancing in China, and brutalizing the Chinese people, and Hitler demanded territorial concessions from Poland. The so-called Polish Corridor was an area between the German-Polish border and German East Prussia. It further demanded free access to the free city of Danzig, today’s Gdansk, Poland. This region, and Danzig, held a majority ethnic German population, and had previously been part of Germany. Poland vowed to fight, and appealed to its British and French allies for assistance.

Backed into a corner, Britain and France vowed to fight for Poland, though both were woefully unprepared. Poland soon learned several lessons: 1) the importance of maintaining a modern military; 2) the problem of bordering two totalitarian, aggressive nations and 3) depending on an alliance with superpowers for your national security. Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939 and its modern war machine totally out-classed Poland’s horse cavalry. Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, and strengthened the Maginot Line. The Soviet Union concluded a previous non-aggression pact with Germany, and invaded Poland on September 17, 1939. Fighting on two fronts, Poland was doomed, and surrendered in late September 1939, with Germany and the Soviets dividing it between them.

Meanwhile, the United States declared its neutrality and on September 9, 1939 declared a limited national emergency. This provided another modest increase in American military strength, providing for the “national defense,” not foreign wars. Famed aviator, Charles Lindbergh, gave a speech on September 15, 1939 espousing neutrality, garnering a large audience.

Just as today, opposition to building military strength covered the political spectrum, and in many cases proved equally naïve. Pacifists did not believe in war period; others distrusted the Europeans, believing they got what they deserved; New Dealers believed military spending reduced social spending; the most sinister openly supported foreign governments, most notably the German-American Bund, and the Communist Party - USA.

While history highlights Axis aggression in the early stage of World War II, it virtually ignores that of the Soviet Union. Germany defeated the Russian Empire during World War I, and Russia lost some of its prewar territory. This included the newly independent nations of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, none of which wanted any form of communism.

It also included the little known region called Bessarabia, now part of Moldavia, on the Black Sea. Following the Bolshevik Revolution Bessarabia renounced all ties with the Soviet Union and declared its independence. Later it voted for a union with Romania, recognized by the 1920 Treaty of Paris, but not accepted by Russia.

When Germany and the Soviet Union signed the previously mentioned non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, it affected these countries. Following the partition of Poland, the Soviet Union demanded military access in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Only Finland refused, and when Soviet troops invaded they were soundly defeated in the first battles. While condemned by Britain and France, they could do little, as they built their military strength.

The greatest shock began in the spring of 1940 when the Soviet Union defeated Finland. Next Germany defeated Denmark and Norway, despite the introduction of British and French troops into Norway. In May 1940 Germany attacked the neutral countries of the Netherlands and Belgium, outflanking the Maginot Line. British forces, facing entrapment, began evacuating at the end of the month, and France surrendered on June 25, 1940.

With all eyes on the German blitzkrieg, few noticed that the Soviet Union demanded Bessarabia from Romania. Romania faced few options, and gave the region to the Soviets, which later influenced Romania’s decision for joining the Axis Powers.

While we cannot predict history, particularly regarding human behavior, studying some alternatives is necessary. Given Germany’s increasing belligerence the Allies should have increased their intelligence-gathering agencies. Had Chamberlain been made of “sterner stuff,” he may have ended Hitler’s political career, and subsequently World War II. He could have alerted the British people of the looming danger, and the necessity of rebuilding their military. Confronting Hitler at Munich instead of appeasing him might have turned the German people against him. Building an alliance with Czechoslovakia and Poland, along with military assistance, may have proven too much for Hitler.

Of course, a more aggressive stance by Chamberlain may have ended his political career. Britons vehemently opposed war at this time, and may have elected a party even less interested in foreign affairs. Suppose France, in the same political straits as Britain, “vetoed” any strong action.

Aggressive intelligence gathering could have provided a better assessment of German military capabilities. After the war British historian, Basil Lidell-Hart, states that Germany’s ground forces were still undergoing reorganization. German commanders estimated this reorganization, and subsequent complete mechanization, would be completed in 1942. Particularly after Munich, Hitler did not expect the Allies to fight for Poland, and did not anticipate war until sometime in 1944.

Of course Britain and France did not know this, and were grossly unprepared for war themselves. We learned after the war that the German high command feared an Allied advance into Germany from France. Unable to wage a two-front war, they would have been forced to withdraw from Poland. However, that may have merely led to an earlier Allied defeat on the European continent.

We do know that the inaction and timidity of the two superpowers led directly to an occupied Europe. It further weakened their hold on their vast Asian empires, encouraging Japanese aggressions.

Neither Britain nor France regained their superpower status, only the benevolence of the new superpower, the U.S., allowed them a superpower illusion. France’s surrender threatened global ramifications, if Germany demanded access in French colonies from the Vichy government. What threatened the U.S. in particular was the French West Indies territories and French Guiana.

Japan demanded such concessions in French Indochina, the modern nations of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam in September1940. Suddenly the U.S. was thrust upon the world stage as the dominant power in Asia. Britain could do very little, its primary worry was survival and then defending the Suez Canal. The Netherlands government-in-exile in England could do little in defending the Dutch East Indies, modern Indonesia. France asked the U.S. for the delivery of already purchased military equipment to help defend Indochina. However, few Americans trusted the Vichy government, and most felt this equipment would fall into Japanese hands.

Despite the suddenness of the Axis Powers’ conquests, the U.S. still moved slowly toward military readiness. Isolationist opinions still dominated in the halls of Congress, though most understood the need for national defense. In August 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) received authority for mobilizing National Guard and Reserve forces. That September the Congress approved the first peacetime draft, with some limitations, but it began the arduous journey toward readiness.

Though Congress began virtually writing “blank checks” for military spending it takes more than legislation for overcoming twenty years of neglect. We lacked training facilities, housing, clothing and the arms and equipment for modern warfare. New soldiers trained with broomstick rifles, stovepipe machineguns and trucks bearing signs reading “TANK.”

Though lauded as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” American industry would not reach full wartime capacity until late 1943, or early 1944. Meanwhile, American military forces competed with the lend-lease requirements of Britain, China, South American nations, and later the Soviet Union.

The increased manpower further created problems for military planners, beginning with providing training cadres. Existing units lost experienced officers and non-commissioned officers for training the new soldiers. Increased troop strength meant an increase in the number of units, requiring new, higher-level command structures. These new commands required new commanders and new staffs, and extensive training for achieving combat-readiness.

Training the soldiers in the use of new equipment also takes time, today such new equipment training (NET) takes about three months. Certainly it took longer then, as the Army transformed from horse cavalry and horse-drawn equipment to tanks and trucks.

Meanwhile the U.S. tried negotiating its differences with Japan, and ending Japanese aggression. When they refused to leave French Indochina and stop their war in China the U.S. enacted an oil embargo. This represented all we could do until we achieved the desired level of readiness for taking military action. While critics and historical revisionists today state this “forced” Japan to attack us, it certainly proved necessary. Japan’s modern industrial and military might required massive quantities of oil, something they lacked domestically.

Japan viewed the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii as the greatest threat to its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” This was Japan’s version of the “master race” concept, using such ultra-nationalist organizations as the Black Dragon Society. It incited racial hatred for the European colonial powers in Asia, and financed subversion in those colonies. What the Japanese did not say is that after displacing the Europeans, they would move in. As direct descendants of the “sun god” it was their duty to protect the “inferior Orientals.”

Furthermore, the U.S. maintained military forces in the Philippines, which threatened Japanese plans. Unfortunately, the U.S. did not change its initial plan for abandoning the Philippines until the late summer of 1941. Building up sufficient military forces in the Philippines required time, something in short supply. General Douglas MacArthur estimated his forces would be ready in April 1942.

Meanwhile, the U.S. negotiated with Japan from a position of weakness, something known by both sides. However, Japanese leaders knew that would eventually change, given the oil embargo and the continued American military buildup. If they could achieve their goals without war, forcing the Americans to accept their terms, they would do it.

The isolationist and anti-war movements continued their opposition, and held extensive public meetings. Various public opinion polls showed the overwhelming majority of Americans opposed entry in the war. Germany’s June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union “converted” the Communist Party – USA from isolationists into interventionists. One group of isolationists, the America First organization, held their last meeting during the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

While Japanese negotiators continued their efforts in Washington, DC, the Japanese attack force cruised toward Hawaii. They gambled that they would deliver their declaration of war about thirty minutes before the attack. Of course they did not, and the resulting “sneak attack” united the U.S. and “awoke the sleeping giant.”

The failures of diplomacy, the naiveté of appeasement and the irresponsibility of unilateral disarmament helped create the horrors of World War II. Once war began we rejected peace negotiations with the enemy until they surrendered, and demanded unconditional surrender. When we entered the war, we joined the losing side and understood that reversing the tide required a maximum effort. The “global community” consisted of the British Empire, China, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Instead of repeating the past, why not learn from it, and accept the grim task ahead of us. Our current enemies know our reluctance for engaging in war, and use this for blackmailing us. Meanwhile they continue preparing for war, including developing nuclear weapons, while we bicker over internal politics.

We seek a diplomatic solution with totalitarian nations that we have not defeated; therefore, we do not negotiate from the stronger position. Though militarily weaker, they use our internal dissension and unwillingness to build the necessary military strength, and use it, against us. Furthermore, they use the timidity of the “global community,” and its jealousy of our power, for creating international dissension. They hope to delay any military response until they are militarily ready, including nuclear weapons. The result could be a more massive cost in lives and treasure, maybe also in national prestige, than if we do it now.

I must stress, I fully favor exhausting all means of diplomacy before waging war, including amassing allies. However, I do not believe in “kicking a dead horse,” and when diplomacy fails, do not engage in appeasement. As in the past, we have enemies who do not share our beliefs or principles, and only respect strength. Diplomacy only stands a chance of working after we defeat them in their sanctuaries, and show potential converts the futility of their cause.