Review of The First American Army: The Untold Story of George Washington and the Men Behind America’s First Fight for Freedom. By Bruce Chadwick

This is a copy of my review, which will soon appear in On Point, the quarterly journal of the Army Historical Foundation. I hope you enjoy it.



The First American Army: The Untold Story of George Washington and the Men Behind America’s First Fight for Freedom. By Bruce Chadwick. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2005. ISBN: 1-4022-0506-6. Illustrations. Bibliography. Notes. Index. Pp. 399. $24.95.

Bruce Chadwick, former journalist now lecturer in History at Rutgers and writing teacher at New Jersey City University, attempts to tell the story of the ordinary soldier in the Continental Army. Utilizing the diaries of seven central figures, including one doctor, a poet, and one chaplain, Chadwick intertwines these soldiers’ stories with small quotations from numerous other sources to bring to life a story that should have been told years ago.
The reader experiences Bunker Hill, Saratoga, Trenton, and Yorktown, as well as the disastrous Quebec campaign through the eyes of men who fought there. Readers are witness to the ravages of smallpox in the camps and posts following the Quebec campaign, and the harrowing winter at Valley Forge. The struggle to maintain the fight through mutinies and desertions is a constant in the book, which enhances the image of the Continental Army and further reveals just how desperate the war was and how stubborn the Americans could be in their fight for the cause. The reader also learns the little known story of an all-black regiment and the story of the participation of blacks in the conflict in which they face opposition based on race and the fear of a slave revolt, but gain the opportunity to serve because of manpower shortages.
Chadwick shows the personal sides of the soldiers, both good and bad. The reader observes one soldier who goes to great lengths to obtain leaves to see his beloved wife, while another leads a secret life of adultery. We see chaplains pushed to their breaking points attempting to minister to the sick and dying, only to come back and deliver powerful sermons that lift the spirits of the army. The reader experiences the dedication of the men as doctors continue to work until near death, while other common soldiers will reenlist even after facing repeated serious illness.
In many ways, Chadwick’s work is long overdue, but it has weaknesses. One of the major areas is scholarship. Numerous worthwhile sources, especially primary documentation, are used, but Chadwick does not give adequate endnote citations, which leaves the reader no real clear structure to check the work’s accuracy. In fact, Chadwick begins his bibliography with the following:
All of the quotes from . . . the central figures in the book, were from their diaries. To cite each of the hundreds of quotes from the same sources would be futile, so the single sources for each man’s quotes are listed below. The citations from the more than one hundred other people in the work are listed separately.(371)
The main issue with this quotation is that there are very few endnotes given the amount of material quoted and covered, which prevents the reader from knowing exactly in which source and where the author used material. Instances of reading over two full pages before encountering the next citation in sequence were common. While the validity of the sources is not in question, the lack of endnotes prevents the reader from fully appreciating the work and may raise questions about this works validity.
The other problem area in this work deals with the chapter devoted to women of the revolution. Instead of mentioning the story of Molly Pitcher or the few women who dared to impersonate men to serve in the Army, Chadwick uses this chapter to talk about prostitution and the sexual escapades of the men involved with them. This may turn off many readers who were expecting to learn about women serving in the Army or aiding in other ways.
Overall, Chadwick presents a compelling story, which will excite readers. His background in journalism is present as the story is well written. However, the endnote issue detracts from the work’s value to historians attempting to do research into this time. If these issues are corrected in a second edition, Chadwick’s story will be more worthwhile and useful for a wider audience.

Daniel Sauerwein
Jerseyville, IL
AHF member

WHAT MILITARY OPTION FOR IRAN?

By William F. Sauerwein

For the past few weeks Iran’s nuclear program has dominated the news, and the speculation of “America’s options.” Most “experts” vehemently state that we must solve this problem diplomatically through the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Others stress that Iran’s defiance requires that the “military option” remain “on the table” for strengthening diplomacy. Unfortunately, no viable military option exists, even in the midst of war, for addressing Iran. Our leaders must overcome their reluctance for rebuilding our over-stretched military, or our “military options” will remain limited.
Iran’s Islamic theocracy became a threat when we deposed our staunch ally, Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979. During the Cold War the Persian Gulf proved a weakness in our defensive strategy. Under Pahlavi, Iran became our regional proxy force safeguarding American interests and preventing Soviet expansion. Then-President Jimmie Carter disliked Pahlavi’s “human rights” record, and “persuaded” his abdication in favor of the exiled Ayatollah Rhuhollah Khomeini.
Khomeini, a radical Muslim cleric, immediately declared an Islamic republic and instituted a more repressive regime. Iran descended into chaos with student “radicals” spreading violence and fear, and espousing strongly anti-American rhetoric. When Pahlavi entered the United States (US) for medical treatment, these students stormed the American embassy. Most of us remember the 444-day Iran hostage crisis as a period of anger and frustration.
The US Army at the time proved very unprepared for any expedition at the time. This Army became known as the “hollow force” as we rebuilt it in the 1980’s. Though under-strength, that “hollow” Army was numerically stronger than the Army we field today. More troubling, our civilian leadership proved unwilling at the time for fixing the problems with our armed forces.
Then, as now, our primary focus was solving the problem diplomatically through third parties. For diplomacy to work, both parties must demonstrate interest in peacefully solving the problem. These “students,” and the new Iranian government demonstrated total defiance, and America seemed unwilling to respond militarily. Today’s Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was supposedly one of those “students,” and may soon possess nuclear weapons.
Given the UN’s actions regarding Iraq’s aggressions, including the failure of enforcing resolutions, the “Oil For Food” scandal and obsession with bureaucracy, I doubt their effectiveness with Iran. The European Union (EU) seems more concerned with challenging American power, and maintaining their oil supply. Just as during World War II, the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm, only American leadership, and strength, provides security.
I do not suggest “going it alone,” we need allies today just as we needed them in the past. However, during the past alliances, America led the effort against aggression, making the world more secure. Today we seem reluctant to demonstrate leadership, or build the strength, necessary for providing peace and security.
While many suggest that today’s threats remain insignificant, not serious enough for major military commitments, I remain skeptical. Volumes of documents exist of such rhetoric regarding Germany and Japan during the 1930’s, proving those “experts” wrong. The experiences of World War II caused the Cold War strategy of containing Soviet expansion.
We entered World War II on the losing side in 1941, after suffering the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor. Achieving victory required mobilizing 16 million military personnel, devoting our industrial output to war materials and imposing economic restrictions on the American “home front.” We financed the war effort through increased taxes; huge reductions in domestic spending; war bond drives and increasing the national debt.
Since that time our willingness for such sacrifices when waging war has steadily decreased. Perhaps that massive commitment for that length of time made us reluctant for such future sacrifices. Maybe our emergence from World War II as a superpower made us arrogant and complacent, feeling subsequent enemies unworthy of our best effort.
For almost fifty years we waged the Cold War as a global struggle, including open combat in Korea and Viet Nam. American forces maintained higher levels of readiness, achieving technological superiority over our enemies. Maintaining this level of strength required the commitment of about 20% of our national Treasury. When the Soviet Union collapsed we declared victory, and many clamored for reduced military spending as a “peace dividend.”
In this euphoria we ignored the power vacuum created with the Soviet demise, and loss of control over former Soviet client states. We did not fill this vacuum, instead focusing on domestic issues and relying on the UN. Unfortunately, the new world proved a most dangerous place, and the UN proved inadequate for the challenges.
Despite the new dangers, and warnings against the policy, the US significantly reduced its armed forces. The Army suffered the brunt of these reductions shrinking in manpower from about 772,000 to less than 500,000. However, the global strategy of waging “two almost simultaneous wars” did not change. Bureaucrats covered the discrepancies through developing rosy scenarios, and increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves for emergencies.
The subsequent decade’s increased deployments into new areas further strained this reduced force, requiring substantial peacetime deployments of the National Guard and Reserves. We began the war against terrorism with an Army worn down by this increased operations tempo (optempo). Concisely, during the 1990’s we developed an Army inadequate for its peacetime responsibilities, and now expect it to wage war.
Strains in our military force appeared about 1996, and some senior military personnel raised the issue. Congress held hearings, but suddenly those testifying became surprisingly quiet about these “strains.” Nothing changed, and the Army kept deploying at the high optempo, with no relief in sight.
Following 9/11, we mobilized about 200,000 reservists, a good strategy, yet did nothing for increasing active duty strength. Congressional opponents stated that we must offset any increase in active duty strength with reductions in other programs. The rapid defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan probably convinced the Pentagon bureaucrats that their rosy scenarios were correct.
A decade of planning and training for these rosy scenarios, particularly exercises focused on Iraq, created a “group think.” Every military planner knows the cliché, “no plan survives the first enemy contact,” yet we still adhere to the plan. I believe this occurs because of the domination of the Pentagon by civilians with Ph.D.’s, and no military experience.
Our pre-war intelligence failed on a number of levels, particularly regarding the continuing guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, our strategists continue failing in the number of forces needed for operations in Iraq, defeating the remaining members of the “Axis of Evil,” and meeting future threats.
For almost two years reports surfaced stating the Army is “over-stretched” for meeting its global commitments. Congressional hearings simultaneously demanded the Army place less reliance on the Guard and Reserves, particularly in support roles. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld suggested “civilianizing” more support roles for addressing these problems, instead of increased personnel strength.
Whether reacting to reduced public support, or not, we soon will begin reducing our troop strength in Iraq. We publicly told the American people, and our enemies as well, including Iraq’s neighbors Iran and Syria. I fully support getting Iraqi forces into the fight as soon as possible, but not abandoning them. Suppose during World War II we liberated France, then told them they must now fight alone as we withdrew our forces.
We liberated France because we needed them as an ally, and as a base for defeating Germany. The collaborationist Vichy government openly cooperated with Axis forces and restricted Allied operations. Likewise, a democratic, pro-American Iraq poses no threat, supports no terrorists and represents a possible regional base of operations.
The obvious future target is the continuing threat from Iran, which openly supports the terrorists in Iraq. Since 1979 Iran has supported Muslim terrorists, including those that killed over 200 US Marines in Lebanon. Ahmadinejad, and the clerics, support destroying Israel, foment anti-American hatred and defiantly pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. Given Iran’s past and present conduct we cannot trust Ahmadinejad, nor can we rely solely on UN and EU negotiations.
With our troops committed in Afghanistan and Iraq we possess few military options for Iran, or other unforeseen contingencies. Wisely, Iran spread its nuclear facilities over several locations, most of them underground and well defended. Talk from military “experts” on television stresses an air campaign and possible naval blockade. They all overlook the political approval required for any military options, doubtful given the heated diatribe regarding Iraq. Politicians from both parties make “hawkish” statements concerning Iran, but they also did regarding Iraq when it suited their purpose.
Regardless of political will, air power and naval blockades do not change a hostile regime. Supporting Iranian opposition groups, while necessary as part of an overall strategy, cannot defeat Iran’s armed forces. Developing elaborate strategies without sufficient forces for executing them does not produce victory, remember the pre-World War II RAINBOW plans.
Defeating a sovereign nation requires a ground war, and our force structure remains inadequate. The Army performs missions from recruiting and training at stateside installations through Special Forces teams disrupting enemy rear areas. Army units also perform homeland security missions, operate and secure an extensive logistical tail and engage enemy combat units. In the past it required seven support soldiers for every combat soldier, if anything today’s technology requires more support soldiers. On the battlefront it takes at least a three-to-one personnel advantage for defeating the enemy. A prolonged military campaign requires periodically relieving units engaged in combat for rest and refit with fresh units. These fresh units maintain the momentum, and provide no respite for the enemy. We must adequately secure rear areas for ensuring the continued flow of supplies, and disrupting guerrilla operations.
That guerrilla force proved more than we anticipated, given our thorough lack of intelligence inside Iraq. Guerrilla warfare largely neutralizes technological superiority since these terrorists easily blend into the civilian population, frequently using them as shields. Cruise missiles and smart bombs cannot separate the terrorist from the civilian, or man the various checkpoints. Defeating a guerrilla force typically requires a ten-to-one numerical advantage, and constant vigilance.
If we invade Iran, a country larger than Iraq, our counter-guerrilla operations will increase significantly. We forget that our enemies believe in the righteousness of their cause, and pledge their lives. Reluctant warriors do not become suicide bombers, and dissidents often support their government when opposing a foreign invasion. Remember the hundreds of thousands of Iranians achieving martyrdom by marching into Iraqi kill zones during the Iran-Iraq War.
Until we build a larger Army we lack a credible military option for Iran, or for long maintaining our current optempo. At some point we must address Syria, which supports terrorists and possibly conceals Saddam Hussein’s elusive weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea’s nuclear program remains a threat, and we must prepare ourselves for the rising threat of China.
Finally, we must make winning this war our nation’s priority, instead of another federal program vying for resources. This requires statesmanship from our political leaders, instead of the normal “blue state/red state” pandering. They waste billions of dollars buying our votes with “pork barrel” projects, including about 10% of the Defense Budget. Pentagon bureaucrats insist things are fine because they developed the plan, and admitting failure jeopardizes their personal prestige. We may not need the level of commitment required by World War II, but victory requires significantly more than our current effort.

HISTORY LESSONS REGARDING SPIES AND TREASON

HISTORY LESSONS REGARDING SPIES AND TREASON

By William F. Sauerwein

When people think of “military history,” they rarely think of spies and treason, yet many of these came from military backgrounds. In elementary school I learned of the treasonous exploits of Benedict Arnold, a general in the Continental Army. During my military career the long-term treason of the Walker family, a career Navy family, became discovered. Recently, the History Channel aired a program concerning German saboteurs during World War II. Now we have American citizens openly supporting terrorist organizations, and engaged in armed conflict against America. This last situation prompted this article, as we seem reluctant to call them traitors, or prosecute them as such.
Before discussing the traitors we must first learn of an American hero, whose exploits are no longer learned in our schools. That hero was Captain Nathan Hale of the Continental Army, a member of a special unit known as Knowlton’s Rangers. In 1776 General George Washington’s Continental Army suffered a series of defeats and he desperately needed intelligence regarding British forces.
Colonel Knowlton assembled his officers and asked for volunteers, and these ordinarily courageous officers remained silent. While they would bravely face death from enemy gunfire, captured spies were hung, a most ignoble death. Arriving late to the meeting, Hale volunteered and his brother officers tried dissuading him, but he remained determined.
Hale, a schoolteacher in civilian life, donned civilian clothing and crossed into New York City, seeking employment as a schoolteacher. He performed his duties for about one week and was caught returning to American lines. His inexperience as a spy soon provided ample evidence, and he responded with his name and Army rank.
He received no trial, no defense attorney and his sentence was death by hanging. The brutal Provost-Major William Cunningham executed Hale, who later hung in England for his atrocities. Another British officer provided Hale with writing materials for writing his family, Cunningham tore up these letters. Just before his execution Hale asked for a Bible, but Cunningham refused his request. When asked to “confess” by Cunningham, Hale spoke those immortal words, “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.”
Such was the treatment of spies during this time, and by British law, Hale was a traitor. Hale understood the risks, accepted the mission anyway and died on the gallows without excuses and whining.
Such courage on the gallows was not limited to the Americans, British Major John Andre did not flinch at his hanging. Andre is connected to America’s most famous traitor, Benedict Arnold, whose name became synonymous with treason. Arnold did not begin as a traitor, he could have been one or our greatest heroes.
Despite Arnold’s military exploits, his personal vanity and ego overcame his abilities. He led an expedition for capturing Fort Ticonderoga, already captured by Ethan Allen. Arnold then pushed his command to northern Lake Champlain where he destroyed a number of British ships and one fort.
He next led an expedition through northern Maine to Quebec, in the winter. This expedition suffered many hardships, with the soldiers forced to eat their pet dogs. Only Arnold’s leadership kept this command together, and his exhausted force linked up with General Richard Montgomery’s force.
Their combined forces attacked Quebec on December 31, 1775, however Montgomery was killed and Arnold seriously wounded. Despite breaching Quebec’s defenses the loss of leadership caused confusion, and the attack failed. Arnold assumed command and kept the city under siege until spring, when British reinforcements arrived. His command fought delaying actions back to Lake Champlain, though his force was defeated they significantly delayed the British advance.
In 1777, despite Washington’s protests, Congress promoted five brigadier generals, junior in rank to Arnold, embittering him. However, he still performed brilliantly during the Saratoga campaign, though at odds with his superior, General Horatio Gates. To rid himself of Arnold, Gates sent him on the Fort Stanwix relief expedition, then besieged by Loyalists and Iroquois Indians. However, the expedition went well, and Arnold returned to bedevil Gates again.
During the Bemis Heights battle Gates ordered Arnold off the field, fortunately he disobeyed this order. Sensing a key opportunity, Arnold led an American counterattack into the British guns, capturing them. The British retreat sealed their fate, and British General John Burgoyne soon surrendered.
Arnold received a second wound, in the same leg wounded at Quebec, which kept him from combat commands. When the British evacuated Philadelphia in 1778, Arnold received military command of the city as a reward. He married Peggy Shippen, whose family held known Loyalist sympathies, and may have inspired his treason.
For all of his military capabilities, he soon angered civil authorities, receiving a court-martial in 1779. The charges were reduced and he was reprimanded by Washington, yet his bitterness increased. Living beyond his means put him deeply in debt, and susceptible to British offers of money.
Using his friendship with Washington, he received command of the military installation at West Point. It was one of several forts defending the Hudson River, keeping British forces sealed in New York City. He offered the British commander, General Sir Henry Clinton, the fort with minimal resistance.
Fortunately, this plot was discovered with the capture of Andre, carrying correspondence from Arnold to Clinton. Andre was tried, condemned to death as a spy and hanged at Washington’s headquarters. His courage throughout this ordeal won him much sympathy, including from many Americans.
Arnold escaped, eventually leading two British raids, one into his native Connecticut, the other in Virginia. His appearance in Virginia helped influence Washington’s move to Yorktown, so ironically Arnold’s last campaign aided the American cause.
He lived out his life in England, where he was largely shunned, because no one likes a traitor.
A more recent example of military traitors is the John Walker (how ironic)spy ring of career Navy personnel. Walker enlisted in the Navy in 1955 at the behest of his older brother, and for avoiding jail. He entered the submarine service and found that he really liked the Navy. While successful in the Navy, his personal life proved far from exemplary. When his girlfriend became pregnant he married her, and they eventually produced four children. Walker preferred carousing with his shipmates instead of staying home with his family. When his son was born he was at a baseball game with his friends.
Stationed at Charleston, South Carolina in 1966 he bought a bar as a side business. It immediately lost money, which added to his problems with his wife. When he was transferred to Norfolk, Virginia he left his family behind to manage the bar. He returned every chance he got, and promised that if it was still losing money in one year, they would sell it.
His new assignment at Atlantic Fleet Headquarters gave him a Top Secret clearance, and access to the Navy’s most sensitive communications. As watch officer he oversaw every communication between headquarters and each Atlantic submarine. He decided that selling the Soviets these secrets would solve his financial problems.
In 1967 he walked into the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC and contacted the KGB. Walker became a “gold mine” for the Soviets because he provided them the secret National Security Agency (NSA) codes used by our entire military. Even though these codes changed every day, Walker’s information gave them the key lists, allowing them to decipher all messages.
Walker became an instructor at the radio operator school in San Diego, California in 1969. Here he recruited one of his pupils, Jerry Whitworth, telling him the “customer” was Israel. Whitworth proved beneficial since he was slated for advanced training in the Navy’s new satellite communication systems.
When Walker’s brother retired from the Navy he fell on hard times, and was easily recruited as a spy. He worked for VSE Corporation, a defense contractor, and stealing classified material solved his money problems.
He could not get any of his daughters interested in the military so he worked on his son, Michael. Michael worked on weekends for his father’s new private detective business and, at his father’s urging, took courses qualifying him for Navy service. He dutifully enlisted in the Navy, qualified for classified access, and became a Soviet spy, all for making his father proud.
Warned by the KGB about keeping his newfound wealth secret, Walker rented a swanky Norfolk apartment for his family. He hired a business manager for his money-losing bar, bought a sports car and 24-foot sailboat. Curious about her husband’s sudden wealth, his wife opened a metal box and uncovered his secrets.
When she confronted Walker about this, he openly admitted it, taking her on his next “dead drop.” She excused her behavior by stating she hoped to keep her marriage together by showing him she cared. When she discovered his sexual affairs, she turned him into the FBI, ending the Walker family’s treason in 1985.
Walker agreed to testify against Whitworth and help the FBI determine the damage done. All members of the spy ring received life sentences without parole, except Michael, who received 25 years as part of John’s deal.
The damage done by Walker’s treason may never be accurately assessed. He began spying in 1967, during a critical time in the Cold War, including the Viet Nam War. We know information he provided resulted in the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo, a surveillance ship, in January 1968. It may have contributed to the still unexplained loss of the attack submarine, USS Scorpion in May 1968. It was investigating the unusual assembly of Soviet warships near the Azores, and disappeared with no survivors.
He further provided the codes used by American forces fighting in Viet Nam. The Pentagon has spent over one billion dollars replacing code machines and other hardware because of secrets disclosed by Walker.
The handling of traitors, including Americans captured as enemy combatants, is not a new phenomenon. However, the case of German saboteurs captured on American soil remained largely buried until events following September 11, 2001. When the United States entered World War II disrupting its massive industrial output became a German priority. German intelligence kept a record of sympathetic German-Americans and German immigrants. Many of these people returned to Germany before the war, and 12 volunteered for the sabotage mission.
In June 1942 eight of these men landed on American soil by submarine, four in New York and four in Florida. George Dasch led the New York group, he served in the German Army during World War I, immigrated to the United States and served in the U.S. Army for about one year in 1927. One of the others, Ernest Burger was also a naturalized American citizen.
The Florida group also contained a naturalized American citizen, Herbert Haupt.
Both groups landed without incident and began burying their uniforms, and equipment. The New York group’s luck ended when an unarmed Coast Guardsman, patrolling alone discovered them. Instead of killing him, Dasch offered him a bribe to forget they met, which was wisely accepted. Suspicious of them, the Coast Guardsman reported this incident to his headquarters, but a subsequent search found the saboteurs gone.
Dasch soon regretted his decision and contacted the New York FBI office, and revealed the entire plan. All the saboteurs were captured by the end of the month, having executed no sabotage.
All were tried before a military tribunal of seven officers appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). The trial occurred in the Department of Justice Building, headed by Attorney General Frances Biddle and Army Judge Advocate General (JAG), Major General Myron Cramer. Defense Counsel included Colonel Kenneth Royall and Major Lausen Stone (son of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court).
They were all found guilty in August 1942 and sentenced to death. Biddle and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover appealed to FDR on behalf of Dasch and Burger. Based on their cooperation both men’s sentences were reduced to 30 years, receiving clemency in 1948 on condition of deportation. The remaining six, including Haupt, were executed on August 8, 1942 at the District of Columbia Jail.
Today we seem reluctant to punish traitors, as with the Walker spy ring mentioned above. This past weekend I watched Frank Lindh, father of American Taliban, John Walker Lindh, pleading for clemency for his son. He appeared on the C-SPAN network at a venue provided by the Commonwealth Club of California. Here Lindh presented a program about his “wonderful son,” portraying him like some “pillar of the community.”
As a father I understand a parent’s love, and that love is unconditional, but Lindh’s denial of his son’s activities borders on ludicrous. Perhaps if he had put as much effort into his son’s rearing, he would not now be in this situation.
John Walker Lindh, alias Suleyman al-Faris, converted to Islam in 1997 at age 16. In 1998 he quit school and traveled to Yemen, a very dangerous place, for learning Arabic. He returned to his family in 1999, then went back to Yemen in 2000. From here he went to Pakistan to study at a madrassa, and probably entered Afghanistan in 2001. If his father was concerned for his well-being, why did he not stop these activities?
The Afghan Northern Alliance captured him on the battlefield carrying an AK-47 rifle in combat. American Special Forces soldiers advised the Northern Alliance and American airpower supported them. Upon his capture he identified himself as “Abdul Hamid,” but revealed himself as an American when it suited him.
During a CNN interview he explained that he trained in Usama bin Laden’s camp and was a member of Al Ansar. This organization consists of Arabic fighters paid for by bin Laden, and he later told US Marines that he was a member of al Qaeda.
Soon after his capture CIA agent Johnny Michael Spann questioned him at the makeshift prison. Later that day Spann was killed during a prison uprising, along with hundreds of others. Lindh was recaptured along with about 80 Saudi, Uzbek and Pakistani jihadists when Northern Alliance forces flooded their bunker. At this point a wounded Lindh identified himself as an American, probably for avoiding the wrath of the Northern Alliance.
Lindh’s attorney told the media that Lindh’s confession had been “coerced” because of the prison conditions. He further claimed that Lindh repeatedly asked for a lawyer, but was denied one. Photographs surfaced with Lindh supposedly taped naked to a stretcher, and supposedly denied medical attention.
Johnny bin Walker was captured as an enemy combatant, as part of a terrorist organization. He became part of an organization that declared war against the United States in 1992. Bin Laden launched a failed attack in December 1992 against American forces in Yemen, supporting the Somalia mission. Subsequent attacks occurred at Khobar Towers in 1996, the American embassies in 1998 and the USS Cole in 2000.
The Geneva Convention does not mention any right to an attorney, or the right to remain silent. Military intelligence people, like police officers, will try tricking you into revealing information. Besides, the Geneva Convention does not apply to terrorists, something widely disseminated by many lawyers on television.
John Walker Lindh, or Suleyman al-Faris, or Abdul Hamid, made his bed, now he must sleep in it. At any time during his “service” with al Qaeda he could have been killed, before 9/11. During his “service” did he participate in any of the many public executions in Afghanistan? Did he participate in any of their other global terrorist activities? While his supporters whine about his treatment by US military personnel, suppose foreign soldiers had captured him.
What of Johnny Michael Spann, the former Marine officer and CIA agent questioning Lindh in the prison, who sympathizes with him? He leaves behind a wife and three children, who will never see him again. Lindh made no effort to warn Spann of the prison uprising. Will the Commonwealth Club provide Spann’s family the time and resources for honoring his memory?
John Walker Lindh is a traitor, unworthy of sympathy or clemency for his conduct. When Benedict Arnold betrayed his country he voided all of this previous meritorious service, Lindh had no previous meritorious service. The Walker family spy ring voided their previous long years of military service when they betrayed their country. Three American citizens were among the German saboteurs captured in 1942, one was executed and the other two were eventually deported.
If this sounds harsh, we are at war, and war is harsh with our young men and women risking their lives for us. As a combat veteran I know the risks, and the consequences of facing someone armed with an AK-47. In combat you live, or die, based on your split-second decisions, if in command your decisions carry much more weight. War is not a computer game, therefore the consequences of your actions cannot be undone. You live with them forever, good or bad, the same holds for John Walker Lindh. He made the decision to betray his country and carry arms against other young Americans, all with loving families. Instead of sympathizing with a traitor, sympathize with those killed in action defending you from Lindh’s al Qaeda friends.

Welcome to the Newest Member of the Team

I would like to welcome William Sauerwein, the newest member of the Military History Blog. As the name implies, we are related as he is my father. William brings 24 years of experience in the Army to this blog. Be on the lookout for his posts and enjoy.

St. Clair’s Defeat vs. the Battle of Fallen Timbers: Defeat and the Lessons Learned and Applied in the Old Northwest Indian War, 1791-1794

I hope that you enjoy this post. It is a paper that I wrote for a History class. I apologize for the small size.
Please make any suggestions after reading.

In 1791, the United States was handed its worst military defeat ever at the hands of the Indians. Three years later, the Indians would learn the hard way about revenge. These two events, Gen. Arthur St. Clair’s defeat in 1791 and Gen. Anthony Wayne’s resounding victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, raise many questions. What made these two battles have such different outcomes? What evidence can be found from accounts of travelers years later? What can be learned from these events today? Both St. Clair’s defeat and the Battle of Fallen Timbers illustrate much about the early republic, both her weakness as well as her resolve. Much can be gained from exploring these two events and the impact they had.

The frontier of the new United States was a wild and dangerous place in the late 18th century. New settlers to the Northwest Territory faced the prospect of Indian raids and the still present British forces stirring up the Indians and threatening war.[1] It was in this area that Arthur St. Clair led his army to defeat while serving as the territorial governor.[2] Estwick Evans, a traveler in the region in 1818, noted the site where the battle took place. He stated, “On the river Calumet, which enters the Wabash, stands fort Recovery, and just above this fort is the place of St. Clair’s defeat.”[3] This account illustrates that this battle was so significant that it was noted by people years later.

What happened at the site described by Evans was an event of unspeakable slaughter and horror. On November 4, 1791, Maj. Gen. St. Clair, having hoped “to establish a fort at the head of the Maumee River” became engaged near the Miami village named Kekionga against the Miami chief Little Turtle.[4] Little Turtle, whose tribal name was Michikinikwa was one of the most respected and powerful chiefs in the region[5], which made him a formidable opponent for St. Clair’s force of around 1,400.[6] The power of the Miami was illustrated in the account of Capt. Thomas Morris. Morris described the Miami as “the very people who have lately defeated the Americans in three different battles”.[7] Shortly before daybreak, an Indian force of 1,040 warriors, composed of Shawnee, Miami, Delaware, as well as Ottawa, Chippewa, and various other tribes, encircled the American camp.[8] The battle began when the Indians attacked the camp of a group of Kentucky militia approximately 270 strong, with a force of around 300. The Kentuckians fled in all directions and their pursuers eventually caught many of them.[9] One of the militia, a man named Bradshaw, later recalled that upon being able to shake his pursuer, tripped him, and “drove [his] hunting knife through his throat, severing his jugular [vein]”.[10] With the militia in a panic, St. Clair’s army was now in a weakened state as the Indians attacked.

The main body of the American force, which consisted of much of the U.S. army as well as many camp followers, took positions in their rectangular encampment area of about 400 by 75 yards, which is why the militia was encamped in a separate area.[11] With the militia in a retreat, St. Clair’s force now faced the full brunt of Little Turtle’s force. Thomas Irwin, a survivor of the battle later wrote that St. Clair and his other officers believed that the Indians “would not attack an army where there was so many [cannon] with them”.[12] As the morning continued, St. Clair would begin to find out just how wrong his assumption was. Unfortunately, for St. Clair, his artillery was ineffective and made no dent in the Indian onslaught.[13] The battle that ensued around St. Clair was one of the three that Capt. Morris referred to in his journal.[14]

The battle began to wear away at St. Clair as he realized that the Indians were destroying his army. He ordered Col. William Oldham to lead a counter-attack similar to that of the Indians. Oldham reportedly told his commanding officer, “No, damn it, that’s suicide. I won’t do it”.[15] St. Clair, shocked at this act of insubordination, responded to Oldham saying, “You’ll do it, Colonel, or by Christ I will run you through”.[16] Right after this exchange, a ball tore off the back of Oldham’s skull and he fell forward dead in front of a stone-faced St. Clair.[17] St. Clair attempted to rally his men, raising his sword and leading Oldham’s men in a bayonet charge against the enemy’s left flank. He repulsed the Indians briefly, however his men dropped so quickly that after three attempts too few men were available to mount a fourth charge.[18] The traveler Francois André Michaux later mentioned another officer who fell in the battle, Maj. Gen. Hart. He stated that, “This officer, of the most distinguished merit, fell in the famous battle that General St. Clair lost in 1791, near Lake [Erie], against the united savages”.[19] The Indians would soon wreak a great amount of destruction on St. Clair’s army as the battle continued to rage.

The Indians enjoyed a system of organization that would be advantageous to them as they fell upon the Americans. The Indians had put aside all of their differences and formed a tribal alliance, in which all tribes were enthusiastic in their roles in defeating the whites.[20] One of the successes in this alliance was the presence of an overall leader in Little Turtle.[21] According to an account from the battle, the Indians “concentrated their shots on the active officers whom they could easily distinguish”.[22] The account continued, mentioning that “General St. Clair had six bullet holes in his clothing but was not wounded.”, however “General Butler was killed”.[23] The Indians were able to use advantages that favored them and would ultimately win the day.

The result of Little Turtle’s attack was frightful. According to the above account, “The battle raged for three hours with the carnage among the Americans about twenty times that among the Indians”.[24] The cost to the Americans
. . . totaled 914, including 630 dead and 184 wounded. In addition, almost half of the estimated 200 camp followers, made up of wives, children, and prostitutes, were killed. Fewer than 500 of the 1,400 soldiers escaped with a whole skin.[25]
Clearly, Little Turtle had handed the Americans not only a horrible strategic defeat, but a psychological one as well. Of the American dead, 37 were officers[26], compared to an estimated 151 Indians killed.[27] This incredible victory would be short lived, as the Indians would eventually face a revitalized American army under a new, tougher commander, “Mad” Anthony Wayne.

After the disastrous defeat of St. Clair’s army, the United States faced the threat of Indians with a much smaller army since many had been killed or wounded in the battle. One of the consequences for the young republic that resulted from this defeat was the first Congressional investigation under the federal Constitution.[28] St. Clair wished to resign his commission and retire while keeping his generalship. However, President Washington decided not to allow this.[29] The investigating committee did not directly criticize St. Clair; however, they found one key area that may have contributed to the defeat. The committee noted,
. . . that the 2,300 men gathered at Fort Washington were reduced to 1,700 “fit for duty” by the time the army began the last leg of its journey on October 24; and that their numbers were further reduced to 1,400 on October 31 when “about sixty of the Kentucky militia deserted in a body and the first regiment [of regulars] was detached with a view to cover a convoy of provision . . .[30]
In the end, St. Clair resigned his commission on April 7, 1792 and Anthony Wayne, a veteran of the Revolutionary War, took command.[31] The stage was set for Wayne to enact revenge on the Indians.

Wayne, an experienced Indian fighter, drove the ideas of “tactics, training, and discipline” into his new “Legion of the United States”.[32] By the autumn of 1793, Wayne was ready and pushed northward. However, because of a lack of supplies, Wayne was forced to halt his push and his army encamped at Greenville, where he continued to train his men. By the summer of 1794, Wayne’s army was ready to move.[33] Wayne was ready for a fight, and having made no contact with the enemy on the eve of the battle, he set his men to the task of constructing a camp, which they named Camp Deposit.[34] Little Turtle was confident that he could defeat Wayne and make him “walk in a bloody path”.[35] Little Turtle had every reason to be confident, having defeated St. Clair’s poorly trained army three years earlier; however, Wayne was not St. Clair and Little Turtle would learn that the hard way.

The “confederated” Indian tribes moved into position on August 18, having fasted in order to make stomach wounds less severe. However, they did not meet the enemy, soon grew weak from hunger and thirst, and dwindled in numbers until only around 500 remained to meet 1,000 Americans.[36] According to the journal of William Clark, of future Lewis & Clark fame, the battle on August 20 began with, “a [shower] of Rain [which] prevented our move at the [hour] appointed”.[37] Clark further noted that by seven that morning the army had formed “Line of March” and was experiencing difficulties as they faced thick woods on their left and “a number of [steep ravines]” on the right.[38] Clark added that after two hours that the advance guard of the army spotted the enemy and took fire.[39] The battle that would go down in history as the Battle of Fallen Timbers had begun.

After the initial encounter with the Indians, the advance guard retreated to the main body of the army.[40] The right flank of the army, led by Gen. Wilkinson, upon taking enemy fire, immediately “formed [and] returned fire”.[41] A combined infantry and mounted charge, in which Capt. Campbell, the leader of the mounted troops was killed, forced the Indians to quit the field.[42] The Indians attempted to attack the left flank, but were repulsed. A cavalry charge drove the enemy back about three-quarters of a mile, and the army replenished itself with whiskey, pushed the enemy from the field, and then advanced to within one mile of a British garrison.[43] Having accomplished this, the army then made camp near the British garrison.[44]

Wayne’s resounding victory did not come without a price. What Gen. Wilkinson described as “a mere skirmish” cost the Legion 133 men, of these 33 were dead including two officers.[45] According to the journal of Clark, the two officers were Capt. Campbell and Lt. Towles, and the number of American dead was 240, compared to 30 to 40 enemy dead out of a force of 900 Indians and 150 Canadians.[46] Clark’s figures may be in dispute, due to different figures appearing in other sources. However, Clark was at the battle, but the problems with Clark’s figures are that they appear to make the victory hollow due to difference in number of lives lost on both sides. One thing that remains constant is that Wayne had achieved an incredible victory over the Indians.

In the aftermath of the victory, the Indians were in a panic. The British commander noted with disgust that the Indians “behaved excessive ill . . . and afterwards fled in every direction”. He further added that “their panic was so great that the appearance of fifty Americans would have totally routed them”[47] Another British officer, Lt. Col. England, noted, “that the confederated tribes no longer could be relied on for the primary defense of the Detroit region”.[48] These observations illustrate the magnitude of Wayne’s victory.

Travelers to the region years later noted both battles and even met with people who served at Fallen Timbers and fortunately, their experiences remain. George W. Ogden passed through the areas of Greenville and Fort Recovery, and noted, “just above this fort is the memorable place of St. Clair’s defeat”.[49] Francois André Michaux noted that the army marched against the Indians in defense of settlers and that the repulsion of the Indians, culminated in Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers.[50] Estwick Evans mentioned a meeting with a Col. P. who was “an officer under General Wayne, during his famous expedition against the [Indians]”.[51] Tilly Buttrick traveled in the lower Sandusky, which was known to be “an important Wyandot village” prior to Fallen Timbers.[52] Buttrick pressed on to Greenville, where Wayne built a fort and established his headquarters after the battle.[53] Edward Flagg mentioned having met with a pioneer who had hunted “where Boone, and Whitley, and Kenton once roved”.[54] The man named Kenton that Flagg refers to is Simon Kenton who served with the army during Wayne’s campaign.[55] These travelers knew of the events surrounding the places they visited and met with many people along the way who had taken part in them, thus making the stories of their travels more interesting and valuable to historians today.

While St. Clair forced a congressional investigation, Wayne forced a peace. Having defeated the Indians and establishing his base at Greenville, in 1795, Wayne prepared to make peace with the Indians. Major Thomas Hunt, commander of Fort Defiance, reported to Wayne the conditions of the Indians. He stated that, “The poor devils were almost starving to death before they got here”.[56] Timothy Pickering, the negotiator, wanted the treaty to hand over more territory to the United States.[57] Wayne was allocated $25,000 in various goods, which included hats, blankets, knives, axes, wine, and liquor.[58] On July 15, 1795, Wayne began the council, stating, “Younger brothers, . . . I take you all by the hand” and “Rest assured of a sincere welcome . . . from your friend and brother Anthony Wayne”.[59] Using the Treaty of Paris (1783) and the Fort Harmar Treaty, Wayne justified the Americans right to the Indian lands.[60] While Little Turtle argued that the Americans were taking the best Indian lands,[61] many chiefs accepted the treaty and the council closed on August 10 with Little Turtle swearing allegiance to the United States on August 12.[62] With the signing of the Treaty of Greenville, the war between the United States and the Northwest Indians was over.

St. Clair’s defeat and the Battle of Fallen Timbers illustrate both the weakness of and strength of the new republic. St. Clair’s bungled campaign led to the worst military defeat at the hands of the Indians for the army. Even though he should have been able to use his superior numbers to crush the Indians, his cockiness and coldness would be his downfall. On the other hand, Little Turtle, fresh from this victory would view the American army with contempt and thus would meet his own defeat at the hands of a much more experienced Indian fighter and general, Anthony Wayne. These two events shaped the history of the new nation, with St. Clair’s defeat bringing about the first congressional investigation in the history of the constitutional system. Wayne’s victory would eventually allow for the creation of a new state, Ohio and ensured that the United States controlled the northwest. Travelers observed these events in their accounts years later, illustrating the impact that these battles had on history. The lessons of long ago can be applied today. In the same way as St. Clair’s defeat was a huge psychological as well as strategic defeat for the new nation, the events of September 11 can be viewed as our St. Clair’s defeat, due to its impact on our nation, both psychologically and strategically. On the other hand, the victories that the United States has achieved in Afghanistan and other places as well as the victories that will eventually come in the War on Terror can be comparable to the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Someday maybe our society will experience its own Treaty of Greenville.


Notes

[1] James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army: 1783-1812 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 164.
[2] “St. Clair, Arthur”, Dictionary of American Biography, 16 (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1935), 294.
[3] Estwick Evans in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, VIII (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904), 265.
[4] Richard Battin, “Early America’s Bloodiest Battle” in The Early America Review, [online journal] (Summer 1996 [cited 25 April 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://earlyamerica.com/review/summer/battle.html.
[5] “Little Turtle”, Dictionary of American Biography, 13-14 (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1935), 300.
[6] Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest 1790-1795 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 167.
[7] Capt. Thomas Morris in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, I (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904), 327.
[8] Sword, 176.
[9] Sword, 178.
[10] Sword, 178.
[11] Sword, 173.
[12] Frazer E. Wilson, “St. Clair’s Defeat: As Told by an Eye-witness from Original Mss.” in The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society, [online journal] (378, Vol. 10, Num. 3, Jan. 1902 [cited 25 April 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=0010378.html&StartPage=378&EndPage=380&volume=10¬es=&newtitle=Volume%2010%20Page%20378.
[13] Allan W. Eckert, That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), 566.
[14] Morris in Early Western Travels, I, 327.
[15] Eckert, 567.
[16] Eckert, 567.
[17] Eckert, 567.
[18] Eckert, 567.
[19] Francois André Michaux in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, III (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904), 178.
[20] Leroy V. Eid, “American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair’s 1791 Defeat” in The Journal of Military History, (Vol. 57, Num. 1, Jan. 1993), 82.
[21] Eid, 78.
[22] Wilbur Edel, Kekionga!: The Worst Defeat in the History of the U.S. Army (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 88.
[23] Edel, 88.
[24] Edel, 89.
[25] Edel, 89.
[26] William Henry Smith (arr.), The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair Soldier of the Revolutionary War, President of the Continental Congress, and Governor of the North-Western Territory (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 176.
[27] Frazer Ells Wilson, “St. Clair’s Defeat” in The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society, [online journal] (42, Vol. 11/Num. 1/July 1902 [cited 25 April 2004]); available from World Wide Web @ http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=0010378.html&StartPage=30&EndPage=43&volume=11¬es=&newtitle=Volume%2011%20Page%2030.
[28] Edel, 95.
[29] Edel, 93-94.
[30] Edel, 96.
[31] Edel, 101.
[32] American Antiquarian Society, A Precise Journal of General Wayne’s Last Campaign (Worcester, MS: The Davis Press, Inc., 1955), 6.
[33] American Antiquarian Society, 6.
[34] American Antiquarian Society, 19-20.
[35] R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 133.
[36] Hurt, 134.
[37] R. C. McGrane, “William Clark’s Journal of General Wayne’s Campaign” in The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, (Vol. 1, Num. 3, Dec. 1914), 428.
[38] McGrane, 428.
[39] McGrane, 428.
[40] McGrane, 428.
[41] McGrane, 428.
[42] McGrane, 428.
[43] McGrane, 428-429.
[44] McGrane, 429.
[45] Sword, 306.
[46] McGrane, 430.
[47] Sword, 312.
[48] Sword, 312.
[49] George W. Ogden in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, XIX (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1905), 36.
[50] Michaux in Early Western Travels, III, 157.
[51] Evans in Early Western Travels, VIII, 120.
[52] Tilly Buttrick Jr. in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, VIII (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904), 78.
[53] Buttrick Jr. in Early Western Travels, VIII, 84.
[54] Edward Flagg in Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western Travels, XXVI (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1906), 215.
[55] Flagg in Early Western Travels, XXVI, 215.
[56] Sword, 324.
[57] Sword, 325.
[58] Sword, 325.
[59] Sword, 327.
[60] Sword, 328.
[61] Sword, 329.
[62] Sword, 330.


Works Cited

American Antiquarian Society. A Precise Journal of General Wayne’s Last Campaign. Worcester, MS: The Davis Press, Inc., 1955. 6, 19-20.

Battin, Richard. “Early America’s Bloodiest Battle.” The Early America Review. (Summer 1996). 25 April 2004 .

Buttrick Jr., Tilly. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. VIII. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904. 78, 84.

Eckert, Allan W. That Dark and Bloody River: Chronicles of the Ohio River Valley. New York: Bantam Books, 1995. 566, 567.

Edel, Wilbur. Kekionga!: The Worst Defeat in the History of the U.S. Army. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997. 88, 89, 93-94, 95, 96, 101.

Eid, Leroy V. “American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair’s 1791 Defeat.” The Journal of Military History. Vol. 57, Num. 1, (Jan. 1993): 82.

Evans, Estwick. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. VIII. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904. 120, 265.

Flagg, Edward. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. XXVI. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1906. 215.

Hurt, R. Douglas. The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996. 133, 134.

Jacobs, James Ripley. The Beginning of the U.S. Army: 1783-1812. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947. 164.
“Little Turtle.” Dictionary of American Biography. 13-14. New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1935. 300.

McGrane, R. C. “William Clark’s Journal of General Wayne’s Campaign.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Vol. 1, Num. 3, (Dec. 1914): 428, 429, 430.

Michaux, Francois André. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. III. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904. 157, 178.

Morris, Capt. Thomas. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. I. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904. 327.

Ogden, George W. Early Western Travels. Ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites. XIX. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1905. 36.

Smith, William Henry (arr.). The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair Soldier of the Revolutionary War, President of the Continental Congress, and Governor of the North-Western Territory. New York: Da Capo Press, 1971. 176.

“St. Clair, Arthur.” Dictionary of American Biography. 16. New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1935. 294.

Sword, Wiley. President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest 1790-1795. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. 167, 173, 176, 178, 306, 312, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330.

Wilson, Frazer E. “St. Clair’s Defeat: As Told by an Eye-witness from Original Mss.” The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society Vol. 10, Num. 3, (Jan. 1902). 25 April 2004 <http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=0010378.html&StartPage=378&EndPage=380&volume=10¬es=&newtitle=Volume%2010%20Page%20378>, 378.

Wilson, Frazer Ells. “St. Clair’s Defeat.” The Scholarly Journal of the Ohio Historical Society Vol. 11, Num. 1, (July 1902). 25 April 2004 <http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=0010378.html&StartPage=30&EndPage=43&volume=11¬es=&newtitle=Volume%2011%20Page%2030>, 42.

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